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The financial turmoil of the second half of the 1990s showed that even some of the most 
successful and fast-growing emerging countries risked suffering deep and widespread damages 
caused by balance of payments crises generated by capital flow reversals.  In fact, as reflected in 
the contemporaneous debate, most of these countries suffered doubly, both from the crises 
themselves and from the burden of the rescue packages put together by the International 
Monetary Fund.2  Stung by the costs of those crises and their resolution, emerging countries 
seemed to have adopted in the 2000s a different strategy, dubbed “self insurance”.  The central 
and most visible, although by no means the only, instrument of this strategy has been the 
relentless accumulation of international reserves.  
Reserve accumulation by developing economies, however, has been a more complex 
phenomenon than has often been recognized.  Firstly, because reserves have been accumulated 
under very different circumstances, in response to different reasons, depending on the country 
one chooses to analyze.  Secondly, because it is assumed by many analysts that these countries 
have better alternative uses for the resources that are being kept idle or semi-idle (invested in low 
yield securities as US Treasury bonds, for instance).  Thirdly, critics and defenders alike of 
reserve accumulation as a defensive strategy do not always properly evaluate the risks of new 
balance of payments crises.  In any case, in the absence of adequate sources of liquidity that 
could offer emergency support on reasonable terms in the case of crisis, it should not be a 
surprise that developing countries tried to identify means to defend themselves. 
In this chapter, we want to re-examine the set of defensive strategies recently adopted by 
emerging economies of which reserve accumulation has been rightly identified as a central 
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element.  In doing so, we begin, in the follwoing section, by examining the motives to hold 
reserves, based on the notion of liquidity preference proposed by Keynes in The General Theory 
of Employment, Interest and Money, and discussing how it applies both at the international and 
domestic levels.  The nest section focuses on how reserve accumulation, as well as other 
instruments currently being adopted or proposed, fit into this theoretical approach.  We 
distinguish the cases where reserve accumulation results from conscious precautionary strategies 
from those where it is a byproduct of policies designed to achieve other goals.  Next, in the 
following section, we show that important vulnerabilities remain even if the country is successful 
at accumulating a very large amount of reserves.  The last section concludes the chapter by 
examining some alternatives to reserve accumulation that could reduce vulnerabilities and 
minimize negative externalities.  
 
Motives for Demanding International Liquidity 
 
Quite apart from any need for capital or external savings of any nature, a nation demands 
liquidity, that is, the command over international means of payment, for reasons that are 
fundamentally similar to the demand for domestic money on the part of individuals and firms.  If 
we adapt Keynes’ well known classification of motives to demand money3 to the demand for 
international reserves, we may define: 
 
a) A transactions demand. Domestically, this is the main reason behind the demand for money. 
As in the case of the domestic transactions demand for money, the amount of international means 
of payments a country needs to retain to cover its payments needs for goods and services 
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depends primarily on the time profile of its cash inflows and outflows.  Normal expenditures 
cover payments for imports of goods and services as well as factor incomes.  Inflows are 
generated by the export of goods and services and by the import of capital.  The latter may be too 
volatile to be counted on to guarantee cover for normal expenditures.  On the other hand, it is 
extremely unlikely that cash inflows from exports of goods and services will materialize exactly 
when needed to pay the country’s external obligations, given their own time patterns.  The less 
dependent a developing country is on the export of a few agricultural or mining commodities, the 
smoother its export inflows should be.  In this case, one would expect a transactions demand for 
reserves to emerge to guarantee the payment for normal imports of goods and services in the 
cases where normal inflows may be too irregularly distributed.  
 
b) A precautionary demand.  In contrast to the transactions demand for money, the precautionary 
demand refers to the liquid balances held against uncertainty, that is, to protect the country 
against the possibility of suffering adverse shocks.  Supply shocks, like the oil price rises of the 
1970s, may suddenly and sharply increase the import bill.  Reversal of capital flows and capital 
flight4 may easily overcome the monetary authorities’ abilities to maintain stability in the foreign 
currency market.  For a country, guarding against adverse shocks that may reduce or interrupt 
cash inflows or increase outflows may be the most important motive to retain reserves.  
 
c) A finance demand.5  Keynes defined this motive to demand money as applying to the case 
where an individual has an abnormal expenditure plan, as in the case of making an investment, 
for example, and thus has a temporarily higher need for means of payment.  For a country, 
particularly if it is a developing country, there may be moments where the launching of a large-
 5
scale investment plan may create an extra demand for international means of payment, above and 
beyond the normal transactions demand for reserves.  In this case, the country can satisfy this 
demand by borrowing, if it has access to foreign financial markets and loans are available, which 
increases however its external liabilities, or by accumulating extra reserves in advance of the 
launching of the plan. 
 
d) A speculative demand. In Keynes’s theory, the speculative demand for money refers to money 
balances held by investors when they expect interest rates to rise.  They prefer to hold money 
until the prices of securities go down to avoid a capital loss, buying them on the cheap when the 
interest rate finally rises as expected.  Normally, one would not think of countries actually 
speculating with asset prices and therefore there would be no speculative demand for reserves.  
However, as the value of reserves held by emerging economies rose steeply in recent years, there 
arose some concern with the growing opportunity cost of maintaining those reserves idle.  The 
possibility was then examined in many quarters of investing a fraction of those resources in 
reasonably safe but higher-yielding assets.  But liquidity considerations should remain 
paramount in reserve management.  Thus, to avoid mixing liquidity management with the search 
for higher returns, more and more countries decided to dedicate a fraction of their reserves to 
constitute Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWF) with the mission of increasing the overall return on 
reserves.  The creation of SWFs worked, thus, as an alternative to the definition of a speculative 
demand for international reserves, that is, to holding currency reserves in anticipation of some 
expected investment opportunity to materialize. 
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Thus, as in the case of domestic demand for money, demand for international reserves 
should be a function of the “normal” value of expenditures with goods and services and the time 
profile of cash inflows from exports (transactions motive), the level of uncertainty about the 
future (precautionary motive), and the existence and value of extra expenditure plans (finance 
motive).  Expected changes in foreign interest rates and the price of securities (speculative 
motive) should influence the portfolio choices of SWFs, rather than influencing directly the 
demand for foreign currency.  The size of the demand for reserves, on the other hand, should 
depend on the existence of ready sources of international liquidity in case of need, and the 
conditions for accessing these sources.  The easier the access to liquidity sources, the lower will 
be the demand for money since users will not need to maintain idle balances if they can obtain 
the money they need from existing facilities.   
Two main features distinguish domestic and the international monetary systems with 
respect to liquidity provision.  Firstly, domestic monetary systems are run by specially-created 
institutions to manage the creation of money in line with the economy’s needs, while no such 
institutions exist at the international level.  Secondly, while domestic economies are usually 
endowed with one currency, in the international economy different currencies can actually co-
exist and compete for the preference of private agents and governments, as it currently happens 
in the case of the US dollar and the euro. 
In modern domestic monetary systems, high-powered money (legal tender) is created by 
central banks and multiplied into a larger volume of means of payment by the banking system.  
The provision of liquidity, at least in principle, is regulated so as to accommodate the increase in 
transactions that will follow the expansion of the economy, while safeguarding the value of 
money by combating inflation.  This can be done in modern monetary systems because liquidity 
 7
is ultimately created by a specific institution with the power and the mission to create means of 
payment in the necessary amount to allow trade to grow.  
Modern international monetary systems, in contrast, are not governed by a specific 
institution with a mandate to support the legitimate demands for international means of payment.  
In the post World War II world, the US dollar has played the role of international means of 
payment, even after the collapse of the fixed exchange rate system adopted in 1944 in the 
Bretton Woods Conference.  This means that the provision of international liquidity has been a 
byproduct of domestic monetary policies adopted in the United States, which are decided almost 
exclusively with domestic goals in mind.  There is no reason to expect, of course, that 
international needs for means of payment will be served by such a policy.  The Federal Reserve 
decides on policy having the US economy’s needs in mind, not the world’s.  Only by accident, 
the pursuance of domestic goals will generate the money supply the rest of the world needs.  The 
problem, of course, is not the predominance of the US dollar as such.  The use of a national 
currency as an international means of payment would pose a similar problem were the euro or 
the yen the dominant currency. 
In fact, as Robert Triffin explained in 1960, giving a national currency the role of 
international money inevitably creates a dilemma.6  For a national currency like the US dollar to 
work as a means of payment in international transactions, it is necessary that other countries have 
access to dollars to make transactions among themselves.  This is only possible if the United 
States generate deficits in its balance of payments with the rest of the world.  If the value of 
transactions is growing, and the velocity of circulation of money is stable, balance of payments 
deficits have in fact to increase in order to increase international liquidity.  The growth in the US 
balance of payments deficits, however, erodes the confidence on the stability of the value of the 
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dollar, undermining its role as an international money of account and means of payment.  This is 
the Triffin dilemma: controlling US balance of payments deficits could restore the confidence on 
the dollar, but at the cost of rationing international liquidity and creating obstacles to trade 
expansion.  Accommodating the international demand for the international money, in contrast, 
accelerates the erosion of confidence on the same money.7 
The provision of means of payment is not an exclusive responsibility of central banks.  
Domestically, high-powered money is multiplied by the banking system when the latter creates 
demand deposits.  In addition, non-bank financial institutions can again multiply the ability of 
doing transactions with a given volume of means of payment.  The smooth operation of the 
monetary system depends, thus, on the way the three types of institutions operate and relate to 
each other.  The central bank influences the ability of banks to multiply the volume of means of 
payment and the banks influence the rest of the financial system in the creation of additional 
liquidity.  
In the first two decades after Bretton Woods, the expansion of international liquidity was 
limited by the general acceptance of capital controls and other restrictions on international 
financial transactions.  In particular, purely financial transactions were banned in a large number 
of cases. Even foreign direct investment was subject to legal or regulatory restrictions in many 
countries.  Practically only trade credit, to support the expansion of international trade in goods 
and services, was accepted without reservations.  Capital controls began falling out of favor in 
the 1960s.  Their reach was increasingly restricted in the following decade and they practically 
disappeared among developed countries in the late 1980s.  In the 1990s, it was the developing 
economies’ turn to dismantle their capital controls, although the process somehow lost 
momentum at the end of the decade. 
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The rapid expansion of financial transactions following the liberalization of the capital 
account aggravated the fragility of a system already plagued by the Triffin dilemma.  The fast 
growth of capital flows sharply increased the volatility of asset prices, interest rates and 
exchange rates, with significant impact on the real “side” of the economy.  Increased volatility 
meant an increase in the uncertainty surrounding the behavior of the capital account and of the 
overall balance of payments position.  All other things equal, the increasing uncertainty was 
bound to increase the precautionary demand for international money stimulating the 
accumulation of reserves.  
These increased uncertainties, naturally, affected much more strongly developing 
countries because external liabilities for these countries are mostly denominated in foreign 
currencies, for reasons discussed in the “original sin” literature.8  Unable to service its liabilities 
in its own currency, a developing country has to be sure it will have access to, or will have in 
storage, the amount of foreign currency necessary to honor those obligations. 
The situation is certainly potentially more dramatic in the case of developing economies, 
but they are by no means the only countries threatened by these developments.  In fact, it was 
precisely the conscience of how serious this problem could be for the international economy that 
inspired the creation of the International Monetary Fund in the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference.  
In its original conception, the IMF was to serve precisely as a supplier of “secondary” reserves to 
countries suffering from balance of payments deficits in a world where the only internationally 
accepted means of payment would be the dollar.  It was only after a protracted debate, in the late 
1940s and early 1950s that the Fund came to adopt its current practice of imposing (sometimes 
exacting) conditionalities on its support programs for countries in need.9  
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In the absence of supporting institutions providing international liquidity at reasonable 
terms (financial costs and policy conditionalities), countries were supposed to turn to private 
financial markets.  The precariousness of this “solution” however was repeatedly illustrated by 
the succession of crises initiated by the Mexican crisis of 1994.10  On other hand, the rescue 
packages by the IMF came to be seen, especially in Asian countries, as a burden in themselves, 
imposing heavy costs, hard to disentangle from the costs of the crises themselves.  New 
strategies, more efficient in protecting these economies against the volatilities of the international 
economy just had to be devised. 
 
Reserve Accumulation and Other Instruments of “Self Insurance” 
 
The experience of the 1990s crises vividly illustrated to developing countries the risks of 
financial and capital liberalization.  Both capital flow reversals and the rescue packages put 
together by the IMF imposed heavy losses to afflicted countries in terms of lost output and 
employment, bankruptcies, and the loss of policy autonomy resulting from the imposition of 
structural conditionalities that even the Fund itself ended up recognizing were excessive.11 T he 
sudden realization that international financial integration made the position of emerging 
countries exceedingly fragile led to two main results. 
The first, and more immediate, impact of the succession of balance of payments crises 
since 1994 was the loss of momentum of the process of capital account liberalization that had 
been going on in force since the beginning of that decade among developing economies.  The 
most dramatic of the crisis episodes, the 1997 Asian crisis, exploded precisely when the IMF was 
proposing a reform of its Articles of Agreement to consecrate the principle of capital account 
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convertibility.  After 1997 this process was decelerated, virtually to the point of a halt, but it was 
not reversed.  
The second was the realization that emerging economies had to find ways to deal with the 
possibility of capital flows reversals other than appealing to the IMF for support.  It is in this 
context that several measures were adopted, among which the most visible so far has been the 
accumulation of reserves.  
Capital flows reversals are particularly destructive for developing economies for at least 
four reasons.  First, given the size disparities between world capital markets and those in 
developing countries, even marginal changes in capital flows in the world market can create 
great volatility in emerging economies.12  Second, capital flows respond more frequently to 
changes in source countries than in recipient, developing economies.  Third, both capital inflows 
and outflows into developing countries tend to induce vast changes in domestic policies in order 
to sterilize their effects on exchange rates.  Fourth, finally, through their effects on exchange 
rates (or in interest rates as a result of attempts to sterilize their domestic impact), capital 
movements can generate important externalities, such as the deleterious effects on exports 
caused by exchange rate appreciation when inflows are excessive, or the impacts on the solvency 
of domestic borrowers in foreign currency, when the local currency depreciates as a result of 
capital flight.   
In fact, both capital flight and capital flood create difficulties for developing countries.13  
In an environment of free capital flows, even small changes in their intensity or direction can 
cause disproportional damage to the recipient economy. 
Developing countries sought to implement measures directed at providing themselves 
some degree of protection.  Short of reinstating capital controls, three were the main instruments 
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for self-protection: the accumulation of increasing amounts of international reserves, to create a 
cushion against the risk of capital flight or to attenuate the pressures to overvaluation in the case 
of capital flood; the creation of regional monetary arrangements; and the development of 
domestic financial markets to accommodate demands for financial resources by local borrowers, 
including the government. 
At first sight, the pace at which reserves have been accumulated by emerging economies 
these last few years is a very impressive proof of the popularity of the instrument.  Table 1 show 
that, for all developing countries, international reserves grew at increasing speed in the 2000s, 
adding almost US$ 2.5 trillion dollars in the years 2004 to 2007 alone.  The perception that  one 
could not count on alternative sources of liquidity should lead to an increase both in the 
transactions and the precautionary demand for money, intensifying reserve accumulation.  One 
should be careful, however, in attributing all growth in reserves to a strategy of self-insurance.  
Particularly until the outbreak of the subprime crisis in the United States, a large amount of 
reserves have been accumulated as a result of capital inflows that are beyond the control of 
recipient countries.  In some cases, inflows were so intense that exchange rates appreciated 
strongly even while reserves were accumulated.  In other cases, reserves were held precisely to 
avoid potentially disruptive movements of the exchange rate.  Table 15.1 also shows that, in 
parallel to an impressive growth of current account surpluses, developing countries also received 
increasing volumes of foreign capital.  In fact, in 2006 alone, net private capital inflows reached 
about US$ 600 billion. In 2007, net private capital inflows rose to slightly less than US$ 900 
billion.  These inflows are not necessarily sought for, or even desired by developing countries: 
they simply cannot be stopped once capital controls have been dismantled.  In some other cases, 
reserve growth is a byproduct of an attempt to promote the expansion of net exports to 
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compensate the slow growth of domestic expenditures, particularly in the presence of restrictive 
monetary and fiscal policies.  In this case, growth of reserves is not a strategic goal, being just an 
unintended result of aggregate demand management policies. 
 
<Insert Table 15.1> 
 
Whichever way one measures the contribution of each of the three factors just discussed 
for the final result, the result is still very impressive in itself, that is, the accumulation of such a 
volume of reserves in a small period of time. 
The creation of regional monetary funds is an attempt to create liquidity facilities that 
may be more member-friendly than the IMF.  It is widely believed that the Fund took advantage 
of the crisis in Asian countries to promote structural reforms that seemed to be more in line with 
the demands of some developed countries than in the interest of the borrowing countries.  Of 
course, it is accepted that monetary funds must seek guarantees that their loans will be repaid, 
but there must be clear principles and mandates to set the types of guarantees that are legitimate.  
The Fund itself seems to have concluded that it went beyond its mandate during the Camdessus 
tenure, since an immediate review of the reach of structural conditionalities was began by his 
successor.  How far the Fund is willing to go to recover its legitimacy is still to be tested, but the 
bad experience of the 1990s has stimulated many countries to look for alternative liquidity 
facilities where conditionalities could be more reasonable. 
So far, however, only one of the experiments created recently has actually matured, in 
Asia, the Chiang Mai Initiative.14  The creation of other institutions is being examined, most 
notably the Banco do Sul, in Latin America.  The original proposal, advanced by the government 
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of Venezuela, contemplated an institution that would simultaneously perform the roles of a 
regional monetary fund and of a development bank.  The conflation of the two roles was, 
however, criticized by some potential members, most notably Brazil, which supports the creation 
of a development bank, but not of a monetary fund.  Other relevant, and more immediately 
viable, initiatives comprise the adoption of local currencies in bilateral trade, as established 
between Brazil and Argentina, which can be extended to the remaining Mercosul partners, and 
the creation of swap lines that can economize the use of reserves in the region.    
Finally, incentives to the expansion of domestic securities markets have been 
instrumental in reorienting the demand for financial resources on the part of public and private 
borrowers into the domestic markets in order to reduce exchange rate risks.  Of course, the 
development of domestic financial markets cannot solve problems related to the scarcity of 
foreign currency, when this is the case, but can keep foreign liabilities under control when 
foreign financial markets are accessed just because they are more liquid or the cost of capital 
may be lower.  Again, a few countries have achieved a significant measure of success in creating 
domestic markets for public securities and/or stock exchanges, but this is still mostly a promise 




Building up regional monetary arrangements or creating domestic securities markets are long 
term processes that may or may not become efficient protective devices in the future.  The 
accumulation of reserves, in contrast, is meant to protect economies against balance of payments 
disequilibria right now.  They are expected to represent a liquidity cushion capable of 
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accommodating sudden demands for foreign currency, giving some breathing time for 
government authorities to devise more consequent policies.  
In fact, as shown in table 15.2, the accumulation of reserves contributed to the general 
improvement in the external position of developing countries as a whole, although a case can be 
made that, after the widespread process of capital account liberalization of the 1980s and 1990s, 
the traditional indicators reported in table 2 may not give an accurate assessment of a country’s 
external vulnerability any more.15 
 
<Insert Table 15.2> 
 
Of course, cushions are only efficient if they are available when one needs to use the 
resources.  In this sense, it is important to distinguish between the cases where reserves result 
from the accumulation of current account surpluses and those resulting from capital account 
surpluses in excess of current account deficits, since the latter implies an increase in foreign 
liabilities.  Borrowed reserves can become unavailable precisely when a country needs them 
most, that is, when capital flow reversals put pressure on the balance of payments, as it was the 
case of Latin American countries in many occasions since the debt crisis of the 1980s.  Earned 
reserves, on the other hand, resulting from the accumulation of surpluses in the current account, 
become the country’s foreign net worth, that cannot be just taken away by creditors in the event 
of a crisis and can thus help to keep country solvent.  
In practically all cases net capital inflows have been an important source of reserves.  
Some countries, however, have accumulated reserves entirely, or almost entirely, out of capital 
inflows.  In these cases, self insurance may be largely illusory, since it is likely that creditors will 
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call back their loans and portfolio investments in case of a balance of payments crisis, as it 
frequently happened in the past.  The extensive substitution of debt securities placements for 
syndicated bank loans as a source of external finance that followed the debt crisis of the 1980s in 
Latin America and the appeal to foreign investors to acquire stock in local exchanges may have 
accentuated the fragility of the financial position of the countries in the region.  However, 
although it is extraordinarily difficult to make any kind of predictions, capital flight has not been 
as dramatic a problem so far to countries like Brazil, Argentina and Mexico.  Capital movement 
reversals have been somewhat strong in 2008, but there seems to be no evidence yet of the kind 
of sharp change in the demand for foreign assets among residents in those economies which has 
signaled the beginning of a capital account crisis in the recent past.    
The situation may be only marginally improved if capital inflows take the form of foreign 
investment rather than loans or portfolio investment.  Foreign investments create implicit foreign 
liabilities that may be as much constraining as the explicit liabilities created by debt.  In fact, 
they may even pose more difficult problems for the authorities since there is no pre-determined 
schedule of repatriation or of remittances of profits and dividends, which can be accelerated or 
decelerated according to changing evaluations made by investors.  In any case, table 15.3 shows 
that, among the major emerging economies, the situation, from this point of view, is less 
reassuring than it may look if one only pays attention to the amount of reserves.  In fact, at least 
in the case of Brazil, the situation has clearly worsened since 2006.  After a rapid fall of the 
current account surplus in 2007, it actually was transformed into a deficit in 2008, which is 
growing very quickly, prodded initially by a overvalued currency and afterwards by the dramatic 
weakening of external demand, even after a sharp devaluation of the real reversed the trend to 
exchange rate appreciation that had been observed for some months. 
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<Insert Table 15.3> 
 
Be it as it may, in the absence of capital flight, reserves may offer a good measure of 
protection against events like the reduction of exports, caused by a deceleration of trade or a 
reduction in the price of exported goods and services, particularly if they take place gradually.  
The use of reserves to maintain payments for normal imports and service external liabilities may 
avoid changes in exchange rates that would transmit the disturbances to other agents, running the 
risk of initiating a contagion process.  
The accumulation of earned reserves may also be an efficient shock absorber in the 
current environment where foreign liabilities are mostly of private responsibility, in contrast with 
the dominance of public borrowers in the past.  Private liabilities are spread throughout the 
economy, making a coordinated response to a given shock much more difficult than in the case 
of public liabilities, where a unified reaction by government can be articulated relatively quickly.  
The availability of an ample cushion of reserves may accommodate unexpected capital outflows 
without causing significant changes in exchange rates, for instance, that can influence the 
solvency of other local debtors.  Of course, a cushion serves to attenuate shocks, to gain time 
while a more definite policy response is articulated, it is not a response in itself.  But it can help 
avoiding contagion effects as it happens when a sudden outflow causes exchange rates to rise, 
thereby forcing other debtors to rush to try to liquidate their liabilities before rates rise even 
more, generating a self-feeding devaluation process. 
The benefits of reserve accumulation do not come without costs, though.  In the case of 
borrowed reserves, the pecuniary costs are relatively easy to calculate, consisting in the spread 
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between the rates of interest paid to service the external debt and the rates received as interest on 
the securities that are held by the country.  As reserves are usually held in highly liquid, low-
yield securities, as, typically, US treasuries, this spread is certainly negative.  In the case of 
earned reserves, the calculation is not as clear-cut, since it would involve the opportunity cost of 
maintaining those resources invested in low-yield securities, compared to their “best” possible 
alternative use, which is seldom calculable with certainty.  In any case, one should notice that the 
main service offered by the accumulation of liquid reserves is not their yield, but the safety it 
provides.16  
It is still important to notice, on the other hand, that the security reserves offer may be 
overestimated when one uses traditional indicators such as those listed in table II.  In fact, most 
studies evaluate the adequacy of reserves in comparison either with imports of goods and 
services or with the value of short term foreign debt.  As difficult and uncertain as the estimation 
may be, one should also consider, in addition to debt, the possibility of repatriation and 
acceleration of profit remittances by foreign direct investors, which usually happens during a 
balance of payments crisis.  In addition, the mass exit of portfolio investments by non-residents 
may also create strong pressures on reserves.  The potential negative impact of these outflows on 
the level of reserves (or on the exchange rates) can at least be calculated.  But the most fateful 
omission in the calculation of vulnerability indices based on the value of the short term debt 
relates to the possibility of capital flight by residents.  It is often forgotten that the liberalization 
of capital accounts opened the possibility for residents to transfer their wealth abroad.  Under 
these circumstances, the volume of reserves do not have to be just sufficient to allow repayment 
of non-residents’ loans.  Reserves have actually to be also enough to cover capital flight by 
residents.  In fact, most of the balance of payments crises in emerging economies in the 1990s 
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were triggered by capital flight by residents using the privileges obtained in the financial 
liberalization reforms.17  
A final word must be reserved to notice that the increase in the number of reserve 
currencies, to include most notably the newly-created euro, in an international system of flexible 
exchange rates, introduces the exchange rate risk in the calculation of national authorities.  An 
even more difficult Triffin dilemma of sorts emerges, because balance of payments disequilibria 
in countries issuing reserve currencies may influence the valuation of (and therefore the degree 
of protection afforded by) reserves through its impacts on current and expected exchange rates. 
 
Conclusion: Are There Better Alternatives? 
 
Holding high volumes of reserves, particularly if they are earned reserves, serves to absorb 
moderate shocks, smooth the behavior of exchange rates in floating regimes, and to allow some 
breathing space for government authorities, postponing the operation of contagion channels, such 
as the impact of changing exchange rates on the balance sheets of borrowers in foreign 
currencies.  So far, the availability of reserves seems to have given some measure of protection 
to economies like Brazil’s, since they allow local authorities to face the pressures resulting from 
the international financial crisis and avoid major disruptions.  The key feature of the current 
situation (as of early 2009), in the Brazilian case, seem to be that while foreign portfolio and 
direct investors are reducing their presence in the national economy, residents have not felt the 
push to substitute foreign for domestic assets that leads to uncontrollable capital flight.  
Under current conditions, accumulating reserves may be a better strategy than just relying 
on the possibility of accessing institutions such as the IMF, or trying to establish emergency 
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credit lines with private banks, as done by Argentina during the Tequila crisis, which may not be 
honored when the country needs them. 
Nevertheless, reserve accumulation as a defensive strategy should be seen mostly as an 
option of last resort, to be adopted when better strategies are not available.  It is potentially 
expensive for the country holding them, particularly in the case of developing countries that 
could find better capital accumulation strategies than just holding idle balances or low-yield 
securities.  It is deflationary for the global economy, reducing global demand, output and 
employment.  
The best alternative, doubtless, would be the organization of an international monetary 
system where a true international currency, free of the Triffin dilemma, could be created as the 
need for liquidity increased.  In such a system, emergency liquidity facilities, accessible at 
reasonable terms, should be created to protect countries suffering adverse temporary shocks to 
their balance of payments.  Finally, in the case of countries facing deeper disequilibria, 
institutions and formal procedures should be defined to allow restructuring of liabilities to be 
negotiated by the concerned parties without causing excessive disruption to the operation of their 
economies. 
Of course, these were features (except for the third) of Keynes’s plan presented at the 
Bretton Woods Conference of 1944, rejected by the United States delegation, who presented 
their own plan.18  The White Plan19 maintained the US dollar as the international means of 
payment, and created the IMF, not really as a liquidity provider of last resort, but as a financial 
intermediary demanding more and more exacting terms, as time passed by, to concede loans to 
countries in difficulties.  Although the creation of international institutions and the attempts to 
formalize procedures represented a definite progress in the evolution of international monetary 
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relations, the inadequacies of the chosen strategy became more and more clear through the years. 
Through time, these inadequacies led many economists to propose versions of the Keynes’s plan 
adapted to current conditions.  Most of these proposals gave special attention to the need to 
overcome the Triffin dilemma and to create more flexible emergency liquidity provision 
mechanisms.  Since the creation of SDRs, one favorite from reformers is the possibility of 
transforming this instrument into a true international currency. 
There seem to be, however, some important political obstacles to the exploration of such 
a reform path.  In contrast with the situation in 1944, there is no clear hegemony in the world 
economy that would give any country the power to impose solutions, no matter how enlightened 
they might be.  On the other hand, there are no clear and convergent views among the leading 
economies as to the need for a new monetary and financial architecture or the lines along which 
the existing architecture should be reformed.  In particular, there is nothing like the identity of 
concerns and goals that marked the two leading groups of participants in the Bretton Woods 
process, the “new dealers” of the US administration and the British delegation, under the 
intellectual leadership of Lord Keynes.  
One should recognize that the IMF has been making an effort to streamline their loan 
conditionalities, after the widely criticized excesses under Michel Camdessus directorship in the 
1990s.  New guidelines have been approved by the Executive Board, making an important 
distinction between policy changes and reforms that were critical to the success of a rescue plan 
and those that are only considered relevant by the Fund.  The former would be still part of loan 
conditionalities, but the latter would just be recommended by the IMF.  There is reason for 
skepticism, however, as to the efficacy of such guidelines, which have been mostly ignored by 
the Fund’s staff in the past in their dealings with client countries.  Be it as it may, this is far from 
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a dead subject and the Fund will be again an important institution when international liquidity 
dries up once more, as it most certainly will.  The debate about the adequacy of its resources and 
of its loan procedures and conditionalities cannot be abandoned.  
  If global reforms in the international monetary architecture do not offer much promise in 
the current situation, it is inevitable that countries will keep pursuing individual solutions, 
particularly in the case of emerging economies.  These economies are already highly integrated 
both financially and commercially to the world economy, but do not have the privilege of issuing 
liabilities in their own currency, at least not to a significant extent.  
The main alternative to reserve accumulation is the reinstatement of capital controls. In 
principle, capital controls serve the same purpose as maintaining reserves.  Restrictions on non-
residents’ capital inflows serve to avoid exchange rate appreciation in times of excess liquidity.  
Restrictions on capital outflows by residents absolve a country from the need to maintain 
reserves to allow these outflows to take place.  However, no matter whether the costs of 
maintaining controls are greater or smaller than its benefits, after the liberalization process of the 
1990s, reinstating capital controls, after private interests have already crystallized around the 
protection of their newly-acquired privileges, would require bold action by political leaders that 
do not seem willing or capable of taking this path. 
The orthodox view is that floating exchange rates alone should do the trick.  Neither 
controls nor reserve accumulation would in fact be necessary if exchange rates could freely float 
in result of excess demands or supplies of foreign currency and converge to new equilibrium 
positions.  Empirical evidence, however, has not supported the optimistic expectations of 
floating exchange rates defenders.  These regimes have been marked by excess volatility, which 
causes domestic disequilibria, particularly in countries that exhibit a higher degree of financial 
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and commercial integration in the world economy.  Besides, under capital account liberalization, 
capital flows become an important determinant of the behavior of exchange rates which means 
that monetary policies play an indirect but no less decisive role in the determination of exchange 
rates.  Under these circumstances, it is difficult to make the case that exchange rates are really 
“freely” floating in response to pure market forces, unaffected by macroeconomic policies. 
This brief examination of alternatives helps to understand why reserve accumulation has 
been seen, if not as the very best defensive strategy to deal with the volatility of the world 
economy, still as the best available strategy.  On the one hand, it does not depend on a currently 
unlikely disposition of the international community to work towards a cooperative solution that 
contemplates the needs and priorities of developing economies.  On the other hand, it is 
politically much easier to implement than reinstating capital controls, since reserve accumulation 
does not threat any group’s privileges.  There is a serious risk that the degree of protection 
afforded by this strategy may not be as high as some countries seem to think, but it doubtless 
seemed to be the least-effort option available while the international economy operated relatively 
smoothly.  Whether reserve accumulation can be enough in the face of capital flight episodes fed 
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